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Abstract—The wiretap channel models secure communication
between two users in the presence of an eavesdropper who must
be kept ignorant of transmitted messages. The performance of
such a system is usually characterized by its secrecy capacity
which determines the maximum transmission rate of secure
communication. In this paper, the issue of whether or not
the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system
parameters is examined. In particular, this is done for channel
uncertainty modeled via compound channels and arbitrarily
varying channels, in which the legitimate users know only that
the true channel realization is from a pre-specified uncertainty
set. In the former model, this realization remains constant for the
entire duration of transmission, while in the latter the realization
varies from channel use to channel use in an unknown and
arbitrary manner. These models not only capture the case of
channel uncertainty, but are also suitable for modeling scenarios
in which a malicious adversary jams or otherwise influence the
legitimate transmission. The secrecy capacity of the compound
wiretap channel is shown to be robust in the sense that it is a
continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, small variations
in the uncertainty set lead to small variations in secrecy capacity.
On the other hand, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the
arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is shown to be discontinuous
in the uncertainty set meaning that small variations can lead to
dramatic losses in capacity.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, compound channel, arbitrarily
varying channel (AVC), secrecy capacity, continuity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In current communication systems, there is usually an
architectural separation between error correction and data
encryption. The former is typically realized at the physical
layer, transforming the noisy communication channel into a
reliable “bit pipe.” The latter is implemented on top of that by
applying cryptographic principles.
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In recent years, information theoretic approaches to security
have been intensively examined as a complement to such
cryptographic techniques. Such approaches establish reliable
communication and data confidentiality jointly at the physical
layer by taking the properties of the noisy channel into
account. This line of study was initiated by Wyner, who
introduced the wiretap channel in [1], and subsequently gen-
eralized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner to the broadcast channel with
confidential messages [2]. Recently, this area of research has
drawn considerable attention since it provides a promising ap-
proach to achieve security and to embed secure communication
into wireless networks; see for example [3–8] and references
therein. Not surprisingly, it therefore has also been identified
by operators and national agencies as a key technique to secure
future communication systems [9–11].
These studies are in particular crucial for wireless com-
munication systems, since they are inherently vulnerable to
eavesdropping due to the open nature of the wireless medium.
Indeed, transmitted signals are received by intended users
but are also easily eavesdropped upon by non-legitimate
receivers. Many of the previous studies have in common
that all channels (including those to the eavesdropper) are
assumed to be perfectly known to all users and fixed during the
entire duration of transmission. However, in practical systems
channel state information (CSI) will always be limited due
to the nature of the wireless channel and estimation/feedback
inaccuracy. Furthermore, malevolent eavesdroppers will not
provide any information about their channels to legitimate
users to make eavesdropping even harder. Accordingly, limited
CSI (especially for the eavesdropper channel) must be assumed
to ensure reliability and data confidentiality. A recent survey
on secure communication under channel uncertainty and ad-
versarial attacks can be found in [12].
A first step in the direction of more realistic CSI assump-
tions is given by the concept of a compound channel [13,
14]. Here it is assumed that the actual channel realization
is unknown. Rather, it is only known to the legitimate users
that the true realization belongs to a known set of channels
(uncertainty set) and that it remains constant during the entire
duration of transmission. Accordingly, secure communication
over compound channels is of great importance. The com-
pound wiretap channel has been studied in [15–19] and the
compound broadcast channel with confidential messages in
[20, 21]. Despite these efforts, a general single-letter charac-
terization of the secrecy capacity remains unknown until now
(if it exists at all). Such a description is only known for special
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cases such as degraded channels [15, 16] or certain multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian channels [19]. For
the general case, only a multi-letter description of the secrecy
capacity has been established so far [16].
The quality of CSI is further weakened by the concept of
arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs) [22–24]. In addition to the
assumption that the actual channel realization is known only
to be from a known uncertainty set, it is further assumed that
this realization may vary from channel use to channel use in
an arbitrary and unknown manner (in contrast to compound
channels in which it remains constant). The corresponding ar-
bitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) has been studied in
[25–31] and it has been shown that it makes a difference in this
case whether unassisted or common randomness (CR) assisted
codes are used. In particular, the deterministic secrecy capacity
may be zero (if the channel possesses the so-called property
of symmetrizability as precisely defined later), while the CR-
assisted secrecy capacity is non-zero. In [26, 29] a complete
characterization of the relation between the deterministic and
CR-assisted secrecy capacity is established; however, a single-
letter characterization of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity itself
remains open and only a multi-letter description has been
established [29]. A Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel where
the noiseless eavesdropper channel is arbitrarily varying is
considered in [32]. An achievable secrecy rate is derived
and the secrecy degrees of freedom are established, while its
capacity remains unknown.
These concepts of compound and arbitrarily varying chan-
nels not only capture the case of channel uncertainty, but are
also suitable for modeling scenarios with active adversaries.
For example, such an adversary may be able to maliciously
influence the channel conditions by controlling which chan-
nel realization governs the transmission. Since the legitimate
transmitter and receiver usually have no knowledge about
the strategy or the intention of the adversary, they have to
choose their encoding-decoding functions in such a way that
they work for all possible channel realizations simultaneously.
Thus, such attacks can be perfectly modeled by compound
channels. It becomes even worse for more powerful adver-
saries, which may be able to jam the legitimate transmission.
Again, having no knowledge about the particular jamming
strategy, the legitimate users have to be prepared for a channel
that may vary in an unknown and arbitrary manner from
channel use to channel use. This is the AVWC, which has
been analyzed in [27] in this context. In particular, the optimal
jamming strategy of the adversary has been identified and it is
shown that it differs depending on whether the adversary has
access to the common randomness or not. An eavesdropper
that can control its channel state in a Gaussian two-way
wiretap setup is studied in [33]. Achievable secrecy rates are
derived based on cooperative jamming.
The analysis in this paper is driven by the following ob-
servation: Obviously, the secrecy capacities of the compound
wiretap channel and the AVWC depend on the underlying
uncertainty set. Now in general, the performance of a com-
munication system (in our case the secrecy capacity) should
depend in a continuous way on the system parameters (in
particular the uncertainty set). Since, if small changes in the
parameters would lead to dramatic losses in performance,
the approach at hand will most likely not be used. Indeed,
one is interested in approaches that are robust against such
variations in the sense that small variations in the uncertainty
set result in small variations in the secrecy capacity. Such a
continuous dependency is in particular desirable in the context
of active adversaries who can influence the system parameters
in a malicious way. Surprisingly, the question of continuity
of capacities for classical communication scenarios is rarely
discussed. However, for the quantum case, there has been some
work. Continuity of capacities has been studied in [34] for
quantum channels and in [35] for arbitrarily varying quantum
channels.
In Section II we introduce the compound wiretap channel
and a distance concept to measure how “close” two compound
wiretap channels are. Then in Section III, we show that the
corresponding secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the
uncertainty set. Thus, for compound channels, small variations
in the uncertainty set result only in small variations of the
secrecy capacity. Interpreting the uncertainty set as the strategy
space of an adversary, this shows that secure communication
over compound channels is robust against changes in the
adversary’s strategies.
In Section IV we introduce the AVWC and study its secrecy
capacity in Section V. While the secrecy capacity of the
compound wiretap channel is continuous in the uncertainty
set, we see that the unassisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC
can be discontinuous in the uncertainty set. The practical
relevance of this observation is that such unassisted schemes
might not be robust in the sense that small variations can lead
to dramatic losses in secrecy capacity. In particular in the
context of active adversaries this means that small changes
in the adversary’s strategy can lead to completely different
behavior of the system. In Section VI we analyze the behavior
of codes that achieve weak secrecy and show that such codes
are robust in the information leakage. This means that a code
that realizes weak secrecy for a certain eavesdropper AVC is
also good for all such AVCs in a certain neighborhood. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notation
Discrete random variables are denoted by capital letters
and their realizations and ranges by lower case and script
letters, respectively; all logarithms and information quantities
are taken to the base 2; N and R+ are the sets of non-
negative integers and non-negative real numbers; (0, 1) and
[0, 1] are the open and closed intervals between 0 and 1;
I(·; ·) is the mutual information and H(·) and H2(·) are the
traditional entropy and binary entropy functions; the notation
H(·‖PXY ) and I(·; ·‖PXY ) means that the entropy and mu-
tual information are evaluated according to the underlying
probability distribution PXY ; X − Y − Z denotes a Markov
chain of random variables X , Y , and Z in this order; P{·}
is the probability of an event; P(X ) denotes the set of all
probability distributions on X and EX [·] is the expectation
with respect to X; ‖PX −QX‖ is the total variation distance
between probability distributions PX and QX on X defined
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max
s∈S
I(J ;Zns )≤δn
Jˆ
State s
J
Xn
Y ns
Zns
Dec ϕ
Eve
Enc E W
V ns
Wns
Fig. 1. Compound wiretap channel. The transmitter encodes the message
J into the codeword Xn = E(J) and transmits it over the compound
wiretap channel to the legitimate receiver, which has to decode its intended
message Jˆ = ϕ(Y ns ) for any channel realization s ∈ S. At the same
time, the eavesdropper has to be kept ignorant of J in the sense that
maxs∈S I(J ;Zns ) ≤ δn.
as ‖PX − QX‖ :=
∑
x∈X |PX(x) − QX(x)|; a positive null
sequence {an}n∈N is a sequence that satisfies an ↘ 0 as
n → ∞; lhs := rhs means the value of the right hand side
(rhs) is assigned to the left hand side (lhs), lhs =: rhs is defined
accordingly.
II. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNELS
We begin with the compound wiretap channel in which
the actual channel realization is unknown to the legitimate
users. It is known only that it is constant during the entire
duration of transmission and lies in a known uncertainty
set. Furthermore, no prior distribution on the uncertainty set
is assumed. In particular, this models scenarios in which
an adversary influences the channel conditions by choosing
the actual realization unknown to the legitimate users. The
compound wiretap channel is depicted in Fig. 1.
The main result will be that the secrecy capacity of the
compound wiretap channel is continuous in the uncertainty
set. The consequence is that the presented approach for secure
communication over compound channels is robust against such
classes of attacks.
Let X , Y , and Z be finite input and output sets and S be
an arbitrary state set. Then for given state s ∈ S and input
and output sequences xn ∈ Xn, yn ∈ Yn, and zn ∈ Zn of
length n, the discrete memoryless channels to the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper are given by Wns (y
n|xn) :=∏n
i=1Ws(yi|xi) and V ns (zn|xn) :=
∏n
i=1 Vs(zi|xi), respec-
tively.
Then the (marginal) compound channel to the legitimate
receiver is defined by the family of channels for all s ∈ S as
W := {Ws}s∈S .
Similarly, we define the compound channel to the eavesdrop-
per as V := {Vs}s∈S .
Definition 1. The discrete memoryless compound wiretap
channel is given by the families of pairs of compound channels
with common input as
W :=
{W,V} = {Ws, Vs}Ws∈W,Vs∈V .
Remark 1. Throughout the paper we will also refer to W as
the uncertainty set of the compound wiretap channel. Later in
Section III-A we will clarify why it is reasonable to define the
uncertainty by the channel matrices ({Ws}s∈S , {Vs}s∈S) and
not by the state set S itself.
A. Codes for Compound Wiretap Channels
We consider a block code of arbitrary but fixed length n.
Let Jn := {1, ..., Jn} be the set of confidential messages.
Definition 2. An (n, Jn)-code C consists of a stochastic en-
coder
E : Jn → P(Xn) (1)
and a deterministic decoder at the legitimate receiver
ϕ : Yn → Jn. (2)
The encoder E in (1) is allowed to be stochastic. This means
that it is specified by conditional probabilities E(xn|j) with∑
xn∈Xn E(x
n|j) = 1 for each j ∈ Jn, where E(xn|j) de-
notes the probability that the transmitter encodes the message
j ∈ Jn as xn ∈ Xn.
Remark 2. For the compound wiretap channel it suffices to
consider codes as defined in Definition 2. However, we will see
that for the AVWC in Section IV we need more sophisticated
code concepts based on common randomness; so-called CR-
assisted codes, cf. Definition 8. In this context, we will then
refer to codes of Definition 2 as unassisted codes.
Remark 3. Since the true channel realization is unknown to
the transmitter and receiver, the encoder (1) and decoder (2)
must be universal in the sense that they do not depend on the
particular state s ∈ S.
When the transmitter has sent the message j ∈ Jn and the
legitimate receiver has received yn ∈ Yn, its decoder is in
error if ϕ(yn) 6= j. Then for an (n, Jn)-code C, the average
probability of error for channel realization s ∈ S is given by
e¯n(s‖C) := 1|Jn|
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn:ϕ(yn)6=j
Wns (y
n|xn)E(xn|j).
To ensure the confidentiality of the message for all channel
realizations s ∈ S , we require maxs∈S I(J ;Zns ‖C) ≤ δn
for some (small) δn > 0 with J the random variable uni-
formly distributed over the set of messages Jn and Zns =
(Zs,1, Zs,2, ..., Zs,n) the output at the eavesdropper for channel
realization s ∈ S . This criterion is known as strong secrecy
[36, 37] and the motivation behind this is to control the total
amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper. This yields
the following definition.
Remark 4. Conditioning on the code C in I(J ;Zns ‖C) in-
dicates that the mutual information term is evaluated un-
der this particular kind of code, i.e., the underlying joint
probability distribution is given by PJXnZns (j, x
n, zn) =
V ns (z
n|xn)E(xn|j) 1|Jn| since the messages are assumed to
be uniformly distributed. Note that for the compound wiretap
channel, this notation is dispensable since we only deal with
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one class of codes, cf. Definition 2. The notation becomes
crucial for AVWCs, where different code concepts are used.
Definition 3. A rate R > 0 is said to be an achievable secrecy
rate for the compound wiretap channel if for any τ > 0 there
exist an n(τ) ∈ N, positive null sequences {λn}n∈N, {δn}n∈N,
and a sequence of (n, Jn)-codes {Cn}n∈N such that for all
n ≥ n(τ) we have 1n log Jn ≥ R−τ , sups∈S e¯n(s‖Cn) ≤ λn,
and sups∈S I(J ;Z
n
s ‖Cn) ≤ δn. The secrecy capacity CS(W)
of the compound wiretap channel with uncertainty set W is
given by the maximum of all achievable secrecy rates R.
B. Capacity Results
The compound wiretap channel has been studied in several
contexts. In [15, Theorem 1] an achievable secrecy rate
for finite uncertainty sets and the weak secrecy criterion is
established. The result has been strengthened in [16] and [19]
to hold also for strong secrecy and arbitrary (not necessarily
finite or countable) uncertainty sets. A natural upper bound on
the secrecy capacity is given by the worst-case approach, since
the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel cannot
exceed the secrecy capacity of the worst wiretap channel in
this set [15, Theorem 2]. For degraded channels (where each
realization of the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version
of each realization of the legitimate channel) it has been shown
in [15, Theorem 3] that the secrecy rate in [15, Theorem 1]
is actually the secrecy capacity.
Although a single-letter expression for the secrecy capacity
that holds in the general, non-degraded, case is still unknown,
a multi-letter description was established in [16, Remark 2].
Theorem 1 ([16]). The secrecy capacity CS(W) of the com-
pound wiretap channel with uncertainty set W is
CS(W) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U−Xn−(Y ns ,Zns )
× ( inf
s∈S
I(U ;Y ns )− sup
s∈S
I(U ;Zns )
)
(3)
for random variables U −Xn − (Y ns , Zns ) forming a Markov
chain.
Remark 5. Note that the limit in (3) exists and is well defined,
cf. [16, Lemma 5].
In the next section we want to use the multi-letter expression
(3) in Theorem 1 to analyze the dependence of the secrecy
capacity on the uncertainty set.
III. CONTINUITY OF COMPOUND SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we analyze the secrecy capacity CS(W) of
the compound wiretap channel and show that it is a continuous
function of the uncertainty set W. For this purpose, we need
a concept to measure the distance between two compound
wiretap channels as introduced in the following.
A. Distance between Compound Wiretap Channels
Let (W,V ) and (W˜ , V˜ ) be two wiretap channels (with
finite input and output alphabets X , Y , and Z). We define
the distance between two (marginal) channels based on the
total variation distance1 as
d(W, W˜ ) := max
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
∣∣W (y|x)− W˜ (y|x)∣∣ (4a)
d(V, V˜ ) := max
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
∣∣V (z|x)− V˜ (z|x)∣∣ (4b)
and between the corresponding wiretap channels as
d
(
(W,V ), (W˜ , V˜ )
)
:= max
{
d(W, W˜ ), d(V, V˜ )
}
.
Next, we extend this concept to the compound case. Ac-
cordingly, let W1 = (W1,V1) and W2 = (W2,V2) with
index sets S1 and S2 be two uncertainty sets for compound
wiretap channels with marginal compound channels Wi =
{Wsi}si∈Si and Vi = {Vsi}si∈Si , i = 1, 2. We define
distances between the legitimate compound channels as
d1(W1,W2) = sup
s2∈S2
inf
s1∈S1
d(Ws1 ,Ws2)
d2(W1,W2) = sup
s1∈S1
inf
s2∈S2
d(Ws1 ,Ws2)
and between the eavesdropper compound channels as
d1(V1,V2) = sup
s2∈S2
inf
s1∈S1
d(Vs1 , Vs2)
d2(V1,V2) = sup
s1∈S1
inf
s2∈S2
d(Vs1 , Vs2).
Definition 4. The distance D(W1,W2) between two com-
pound wiretap channels with uncertainty sets W1 and W2 is
defined as
D(W1,W2) = max
{
d1(W1,W2), d2(W1,W2),
d1(V1,V2), d2(V1,V2)
}
.
(5)
Roughly speaking, the distance D(W1,W2) between two
compound wiretap channels is given by the largest distance in
(4) for all possible channel realizations in the corresponding
uncertainty sets W1 and W2. It characterizes how “close” or
similar these two compound wiretap channels are. Accord-
ingly, it can also be interpreted as a measure of how well one
compound wiretap channel can be approximated by another
one.
Further, this definition has the following implications. Let
W be an uncertainty set with state set S and further let
{Wn}n∈N be a sequence with respective state sets {Sn}n∈N
that satisfy
lim
n→∞D(W,Wn) = 0.
Then there exists for every channel realization (Wsˆ, Vsˆ) from
the uncertainty set W = {W,V} with state set S a sequence
{sˆn}n∈N with sˆn ∈ Sˆn and
lim
n→∞maxx∈X
∑
y∈Y
∣∣Wsˆ(y|x)−Wsˆn(y|x)∣∣ = 0
lim
n→∞maxx∈X
∑
z∈Z
∣∣Vsˆ(z|x)− Vsˆn(z|x)∣∣ = 0.
1Note that it is not important which particular norm is used to define the
distance. This follows from the fact the output alphabet Y is finite so that all
norms are equivalent. Choosing a norm other than the total variation distance
in (4) would only lead to slightly different constants in the results below (e.g.
in (9) of Theorem 2.).
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Ws2(·|x1)
Ws1(·|x1)
Ws1(·|x2)
Ws2(·|x2)
(0, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)



M12
M11 M22
M21
Fig. 2. Output probability distributions on Y . The corner points correspond to
the stochastic matrices with P{Y = yi} = 1, i = 1, 2, 3. The shaded areas
are -regions where all stochastic matrices are close to a specific stochastic
matrix according to (4). Note that the shape of these regions depend on the
applied norm.
Moreover, for every  > 0 there exists an n0 = n0() such that
for all n ≥ n0 and all (Wsˆ, Vsˆ) ∈Wn there exists a channel
realization (Ws˜, Vs˜) ∈W such that
max
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
∣∣Wsˆ(y|x)−Ws˜(y|x)∣∣ < 
max
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
∣∣Vsˆ(z|x)− Vs˜(z|x)∣∣ < .
Finally, we want to illustrate this concept of distance be-
tween channels with the help of a small example. Therefore,
let Y = {y1, y2, y3}, X = {x1, x2}, and S = {s1, s2} with
|Y| = 3, |X | = 2, and |S| = 2 respectively. Having two
possible states, the (single-user) compound channel W1 =
{Ws1 ,Ws2} consists of two possible channel realizations Ws1
and Ws2 . Such a compound channel is visualized in Fig. 2.
Now, if one is interested in constructing a second AVC
W2 = {W˜s}s∈S˜ with state set S˜ that is “close” to W1 in
the sense that D(W1,W2) < , cf. (5), then the following
conditions must be satisfied:
W˜s(·|x1) ∈M1 for all s ∈ S˜
W˜s(·|x2) ∈M2 for all s ∈ S˜
with M1 = M11 ∪ M12 and M2 = M21 ∪ M22 the -
regions around the initial channel realizations as defined in
Fig. 2. Note that the reverse direction holds as well.
This discussion shows the necessity of defining the dis-
tance between compound channels in terms of {Ws}s∈S and
{W˜s}s∈S˜ and not by the state sets S and S˜ themselves.
Obviously, with the former definition, two compound channels
can be “close” in their uncertainty sets although their state
sets may differ a lot. For example, in the previous discussion,
the constructed state set S˜ could consist of infinitely many
elements which is quite different from the original set S which
consists of only two elements.
B. Continuity of Compound Secrecy Capacity
Now we want to study what happens if there are small
variations in the uncertainty set. Obviously, it is desirable to
have a continuous behavior of the secrecy capacity meaning
that small variations in the uncertainty set should only lead
to small variations in the corresponding secrecy capacity. For
the analysis, we need two important lemmas. Similar results
were first stated and proved in [38] and [34] in the context
of quantum information theory. In this paper, we consider
classical probability distributions only which allow us to obtain
similar results with better constants.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be finite alphabets and  ∈ (0, 1)
be arbitrary. Then for all joint probability distributions
PXY , QXY ∈ P(X × Y) with ‖PXY − QXY ‖ ≤  it holds
that ∣∣H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖QXY )∣∣ ≤ δ1(, |Y|) (6)
with δ1(, |Y|) := 2 log |Y| + 2H2(). Here, H(Y |X‖PXY )
denotes the conditional entropy of Y given X when X and Y
are distributed according to the joint probability distribution
PXY ∈ P(X × Y).
Proof: The proof is an adaptation of the corresponding
proof in [38] for quantum sources. However, restricting our-
selves to classical probability distributions allow us to obtain
better constants. For completeness, the proof can be found in
Appendix A.
Note that the right hand side of (6) depends only on the size
of the alphabet Y , but it is independent of X . This observation
will be crucial for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Let X and Y be finite alphabets and W, W˜ : X →
P(Y) be arbitrary channels with
d(W, W˜ ) ≤  (7)
for some  > 0. For arbitrary n ∈ N, let U be an arbitrary
finite set, PU ∈ P(U) the uniform distribution on U , and
E(xn|u), xn ∈ Xn, an arbitrary stochastic encoder, cf. (1).
We consider the probability distributions
PUY n(u, y
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
Wn(yn|xn)E(xn|u)PU (u)
P˜UY n(u, y
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
W˜n(yn|xn)E(xn|u)PU (u).
Then it holds that∣∣I(U ;Y n‖P )− I(U ;Y n‖P˜ )∣∣ ≤ nδ2(, |Y|) (8)
with δ2(, |Y|) := 4 log |Y|+ 4H2().
Proof: The proof is an adaptation of the proof in [34]
for quantum capacities. Considering classical probability dis-
tributions allows proving results with better constants. For
completeness, the proof can be found in Appendix B.
Note that inequality (8) depends only on the size of the
output alphabet Y , but is independent of the size of U and the
chosen stochastic encoder.
Theorem 2. Let  ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. Let W1 and W2
be uncertainty sets with corresponding state sets S1 and S2
defining two compound wiretap channels. If
D(W1,W2) < ,
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then it holds that∣∣CS(W1)− CS(W2)∣∣ ≤ δ(, |Y|, |Z|) (9)
with δ(, |Y|, |Z|) := 4 log |Y||Z| + 8H2() a constant de-
pending on the distance  and the output alphabet sizes |Y|
and |Z|.
Proof: Let ξ > 0 be arbitrary but fixed. There exists an
sˆ1 = sˆ1(ξ) such that
inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1) ≥ I(U ;Y n‖P sˆ1)− ξ.
By assumption, there exists also an sˆ2 = sˆ2(sˆ1) such that
d(Wsˆ1 ,Wsˆ2) < . This implies∣∣I(U ;Y n‖P sˆ1)− I(U ;Y n‖P sˆ2)∣∣ ≤ nδ2(, |Y|)
by Lemma 2, cf. (8). With this we obtain
inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1) ≥ I(U ;Y n‖P sˆ2)− nδ2(, |Y|)− ξ
≥ inf
s2∈S2
I(U ;Y n‖P s2)− nδ2(, |Y|)− ξ.
(10)
Note that relation (10) holds for all ξ > 0. Since, the left hand
side does not depend on δ, we obtain
inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1) ≥ inf
s2∈S2
I(U ;Y n‖P s2)− nδ2(, |Y|).
(11)
We observe that if we exchange the roles of S1 and S2
in the previous derivation, we end up with an expression as
in (11), where the infima over S1 and S2 are interchanged.
Accordingly, this means that∣∣ inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1)− inf
s2∈S2
I(U ;Y n‖P s2)∣∣ ≤ nδ2(, |Y|).
The same arguments lead to∣∣ sup
s1∈S1
I(U ;Zn‖P s1)− sup
s2∈S2
I(U ;Zn‖P s2)∣∣ ≤ nδ2(, |Z|)
so that we conclude∣∣∣ inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1)− sup
s1∈S1
I(U ;Zn‖P s1)
− ( inf
s2∈S2
I(U ;Y n‖P s2)− sup
s2∈S2
I(U ;Zn‖P s2))∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1)− inf
s2∈S2
I(U ;Y n‖P s2)
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣ sup
s1∈S1
I(U ;Zn‖P s1)− sup
s2∈S2
I(U ;Zn‖P s2)
∣∣∣
≤ nδ2(, |Y|) + nδ2(, |Z|) = nδ(, |Y|, |Z|)
with δ(, |Y|, |Z|) = 4 log |Y||Z|+ 8H2(). But this implies
for the secrecy capacities
1
n
(
inf
s1∈S1
I(U ;Y n‖P s1)− sup
s1∈S1
I(U ;Zn‖P s1)
)
≤ 1
n
(
inf
s2∈S2
I(U ;Y n‖P s2)− sup
s2∈S2
I(U ;Zn‖P s2)
)
+ δ(, |Y|, |Z|)
so that
CS(W1) ≤ CS(W2) + δ(, |Y|, |Z|). (12)
max
sn∈Sn
I(J ;Znsn)≤δn
Jˆ
State sn
J
Xn
Y nsn
Znsn
Dec ϕ
Eve
Enc E W
V nsn
Wnsn
Fig. 3. Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. In contrast to the compound
wiretap channel, the transmission is now governed by an unknown state
sequence sn ∈ Sn of length n, which may vary in an unknown manner
from channel use to channel use.
Again, we can exchange the roles of S1 and S2 in the
derivation above to obtain a relation as in (12) where CS(W1)
and CS(W2) are interchanged. Thus, we have∣∣CS(W1)− CS(W2)∣∣ ≤ δ(, |Y|, |Z|)
which proves the desired result.
Remark 6. Note that (9) explicitly quantifies by δ(, |Y|, |Z|)
how much the secrecy capacity can differ in terms of the
distance  and the channel output alphabets |Y| and |Z|.
Corollary 1. For any compound wiretap channel with un-
certainty set W and any sequence {Wn}n∈N satisfying
limn→∞D(W,Wn) = 0, it holds that
CS(W) = lim
n→∞CS(Wn).
Proof: The result follows immediately from (9) of The-
orem 2.
C. Discussion
In this section we have shown that the secrecy capacity
of the compound wiretap channel is a continuous function
of the uncertainty set. This means that small variations in
the uncertainty set result only in small variations of the
corresponding secrecy capacity. This is in particular crucial in
the context of adversaries, where the uncertainty set reflects the
adversary’s strategy space. It is a necessary requirement for a
system design to be robust, i.e., having continuous dependency,
against such changes in strategies.
Finally, we want to highlight that the continuity of the
secrecy capacity was established without having a single-letter
description available. Although a multi-letter characterization
of the secrecy capacity as given in Theorem 1 is not efficiently
computable, it is extremely useful for deriving certain proper-
ties such as continuity as demonstrated in Theorem 2.
IV. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNEL
We continue our analysis with the arbitrarily varying wire-
tap channel. In contrast to the previously studied compound
wiretap channel, the unknown channel realization may vary in
an unknown and arbitrary manner from channel use to channel
use. The AVWC is depicted in Fig. 3.
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This model includes the scenario of active adversaries, who
are able to jam the legitimate transmission. Since an adversary
will not share any information about the jamming signal, the
legitimate users must be prepared for the worst: arbitrary
and unknown interfering sequences. This motivates the use
of AVCs for such scenarios as well.
The main result for the AVWC will be that its unassisted
secrecy capacity is a discontinuous function of the uncertainty
set. Accordingly, unassisted strategies will not be robust
against such classes of attacks. In particular, we will show
that even for the simplest case of an uncertainty set with only
two states, the corresponding unassisted secrecy capacity will
be discontinuous in the uncertainty set. Obviously, this is then
also true for more general AVWCs, whose uncertainty sets
contain more elements. Note that the case of an uncertainty set
with one element does not define an AVWC (since the channel
realization naturally stays constant for the whole duration
of transmission), but belongs to compound wiretap channels,
whose secrecy capacity is continuous.
As before let X , Y , and Z be finite input and output sets
and S be the state set. But in contrast to the compound wiretap
channel in Section II, we assume S to be finite in the sequel.
Then for a fixed state sequence sn ∈ Sn of length n, the
discrete memoryless channel to the legitimate receiver is given
by Wnsn(y
n|xn) = Wn(yn|xn, sn) := ∏ni=1W (yi|xi, si).
Then the family of channels for all sn ∈ Sn defines the
(marginal) AVC to the legitimate receiver as
W := {Wnsn}sn∈Sn .
In addition, for any probability distribution q ∈ P(S) we
define the averaged channel as
Wq(y|x) =
∑
s∈S
W (y|x, s)q(s). (13)
An important property of an AVC is the so-called concept
of symmetrizability as defined below.
Definition 5. An AVC is called symmetrizable if there exists
a stochastic matrix σ : X → P(S) such that∑
s∈S
W (y|x1, s)σ(s|x2) =
∑
s∈S
W (y|x2, s)σ(s|x1)
holds for all x1, x2 ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Roughly speaking, a symmetrizable AVC can “simulate”
a valid input, which makes it impossible for the decoder to
decide on the correct codeword.
Similarly for the channel to the eavesdropper, we de-
fine the discrete memoryless channel as V nsn(z
n|xn) =
V n(zn|xn, sn) := ∏ni=1 V (zi|xi, si) for a given state se-
quence sn ∈ Sn. Further, we set V := {V nsn}sn∈Sn and
Vq(z|x) =
∑
s∈S V (z|x, s)q(s) for q ∈ P(S).
Definition 6. The discrete memoryless arbitrarily varying
wiretap channel is given by the families of pairs of channels
with common input as
W :=
{W,V} = {Wnsn , V nsn}Wn
sn
∈W,V n
sn
∈V .
A. Unassisted Codes
The definition of an unassisted (n, Jn)-code C for the
AVWC is the same as for the compound wiretap channel in
Definition 2: It consists of a stochastic encoder as in (1) and
a deterministic decoder as in (2).
The difference lies in the reliability and secrecy criteria as
we have now to consider state sequences sn ∈ Sn of length n.
Thus, for given sn ∈ Sn the average probability of decoding
error at the legitimate receiver is
e¯n(s
n‖C) := 1|Jn|
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn:ϕ(yn) 6=j
Wn(yn|xn, sn)E(xn|j)
and the confidentiality of the message is measured by
maxsn∈Sn I(J ;Znsn‖C) ≤ δn with Znsn = (Zs1 , Zs2 , ..., Zsn).
Definition 7. A rate R > 0 is said to be an achievable secrecy
rate for the AVWC if for any τ > 0 there exist an n(τ) ∈ N,
positive null sequences {λn}n∈N, {δn}n∈N, and a sequence of
(n, Jn)-codes {Cn}n∈N such that for all n ≥ n(τ) we have
1
n log Jn ≥ R− τ ,
max
sn∈Sn
e¯n(s
n‖Cn) ≤ λn, (14)
and
max
sn∈Sn
I(J ;Znsn‖Cn) ≤ δn. (15)
The unassisted secrecy capacity CS(W) of the AVWC with
uncertainty set W is given by the supremum of all achievable
secrecy rates R.
Remark 7. Conditions (14) and (15) already indicate that an
active adversary may have different strategies. On the one
hand, it can try to disturb the legitimate communication as
much as possible by choosing the state sequence in such a way
that the probability of error (14) is maximized. On the other
hand, it can try to maximize the information leakage (15).
Of course, any strategy in between is also a valid jamming
strategy.
Unfortunately, such unassisted approaches do not suffice to
establish reliable communication over symmetrizable AVCs;
indeed, the corresponding capacity is zero in this case [24, 26,
27]. This necessitates the use of more sophisticated strategies
based on common randomness.
B. CR-Assisted Codes
CR is modeled by a random variable Γ taking values in a
finite set Gn according to a distribution PΓ ∈ P(Gn). It enables
transmitter and receiver to coordinate their choices of encoder
(1) and decoder (2) according to the realization γ ∈ Gn.
Definition 8. A CR-assisted (n, Jn,Gn, PΓ )-code CCR is given
by a family of unassisted codes{C(γ) : γ ∈ Gn}
together with a random variable Γ taking values in Gn with
|Gn| <∞ according to PΓ ∈ P(Gn).
The reliability and secrecy constraints from above extend
to CR-assisted codes in the following way: The mean average
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probability of error for sn ∈ Sn is given by e¯CR,n(sn‖CCR) =
EΓ [e¯n(sn‖C(Γ ))], i.e.,
e¯CR,n(s
n‖CCR) := 1|Jn|
∑
j∈Jn
∑
γ∈Gn
∑
xn∈Xn
×
∑
yn:ϕγ(yn) 6=j
Wn(yn|xn, sn)Eγ(xn|j)PΓ (γ).
With I(J ;Znsn‖CCR) = EΓ [I(J ;Znsn‖C(Γ ))] the secrecy re-
quirement becomes
max
sn∈Sn
∑
γ∈Gn
I(J ;Znsn‖C(γ))PΓ (γ) ≤ δn.
Definitions of a CR-assisted achievable secrecy rate and the
CR-assisted secrecy capacity CS,CR(W) follow accordingly.
C. Capacity Results
Studies have considered the secrecy capacity of the AVWC
[25–30] where the latter use the strong secrecy criterion.
In particular, the relation between the secrecy capacities for
unassisted and CR-assisted codes has been completely char-
acterized in [30].
Theorem 3 ([30]). If the CR-assisted secrecy capacity satisfies
CS,CR(W) > 0, then the unassisted secrecy capacity is given
by
CS(W) = CS,CR(W)
if and only if the AVC W to the legitimate receiver is non-
symmetrizable. If the AVCW is symmetrizable, then CS(W) =
0. If CS(W) = 0 and CS,CR(W) > 0, then the AVC W is
symmetrizable.
The unassisted secrecy capacity CS(W) of the AVWC
W is completely known in terms of its CR-assisted secrecy
capacity CS,CR(W). A multi-letter description of CS,CR(W)
itself has been recently established in [29], while a single-
letter expression remains open.
Remark 8. The multi-letter description of the CR-assisted
secrecy capacity CS,CR(W) can now be used to show that it
depends in a continuous way on the corresponding uncertainty
set W. This can be done as in Section II-A for the compound
wiretap channel, where the multi-letter description of the
secrecy capacity CS(W) in Theorem 1 is used in Theorem 2
to show that it depends continuously on W.
V. DISCONTINUITY OF AVWC SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section we study the continuity of the unassisted
secrecy capacity CS(W) of the AVWC with uncertainty set
W. We will use Theorem 3 which provides a characterization
in terms of its corresponding CR-assisted secrecy capacity
CS,CR(W). But in contrast to the previously studied compound
wiretap channel, we do not make use of any multi-letter
characterization of the secrecy capacity as in Section III.
Nonetheless, we will be able to show by elementary cal-
culations that the unassisted secrecy capacity CS(W) is dis-
continuous in the uncertainty setW. Similar to the compound
wiretap channel, we ask the question: if the distance between
two AVWCs is small, i.e., D(W1,W2) < , does this imply
that CS(W1)− CS(W2) is small as well?
In more detail, let {Wn}n∈N be a sequence of finite
uncertainty sets, which converges to a finite set W∗ in terms
of D-distance. The question is then whether or not this implies
lim
n→∞CS(Wn) = CS(W
∗). (16)
In the following we will examine this equation via a simple
example to show that (16) does not hold in general.
A. Secrecy Capacity with Discontinuity Point
The aim of this part is to construct an AVWC whose
unassisted secrecy capacity has a discontinuity point. To do so,
we consider a communication scenario with input and output
alphabets of sizes |X | = 2, |Y| = 3, |Z| = 2, and |S| = 2.
Let us first consider the communication channel to the
legitimate receiver. To construct a suitable AVC for this link,
we make use of an example which first appeared in [22] and
which was later also discussed in [23, Example 1]. We follow
this example and construct an AVC to the legitimate receiver
with uncertainty set
W = {W1,W2} (17)
where
W1 :=
(
1 0 0
0 0 1
)
and W2 :=
(
0 0 1
0 1 0
)
.
We know from [23] that W defines a symmetrizable AVC so
that its unassisted capacity is zero, i.e., C(W) = 0.
Further, with the channel
Wˆ :=
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
)
(18)
we define the trivial AVC whose two elements are identical as
Wˆ = {Wˆ , Wˆ}. (19)
Now, for the channel to the eavesdropper, we define the
“useless” channel
V :=
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
. (20)
Then the set V = {V, V } defines a corresponding AVC to the
eavesdropper.
These definitions finally create with (17), (19), and (20) the
following two AVWCs specified by their uncertainty sets:
W :=
{W,V} and Wˆ := {Wˆ,V}.
Moreover, we can define a convex combination of these two
AVWCs as
W(λ) =
{{W1(λ),W2(λ)},V} for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, (21)
with convex combinations
W1(λ) = W1,λ = (1− λ)W1 + λWˆ (22a)
W2(λ) = W2,λ = (1− λ)W2 + λWˆ . (22b)
Note that (21) is indeed a convex combination of the eaves-
dropper AVC as well which is trivial in this case as we have
identical elements.
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Now, the following result shows that the unassisted secrecy
capacity CS(W(λ)) is discontinuous in λ.
Theorem 4. The following assertions hold for the previous
example:
1) The CR-assisted secrecy capacity CS,CR(W(λ)) is con-
tinuous in λ for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and it holds that
min
λ∈[0,1]
CS,CR(W(λ)) > 0. (23)
2) The unassisted secrecy capacity CS(W(λ)) is continu-
ous in λ for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. It holds that CS(W(0)) = 0
and further that
lim
λ↘0
CS(W(λ)) > 0, (24)
i.e., λ = 0 is a discontinuity point of CS(·).
Proof: Let us first give an outline of the proof which is
divided into several steps. First, we will show that the AVC
W(λ) = {W1(λ),W2(λ)} is non-symmetrizable for all λ ∈
(0, 1]. This implies then that
CS(W(λ)) = CS,CR(W(λ)) for all λ ∈ (0, 1] (25)
by Theorem 3. As a second step, we will then show that
CS,CR(W(λ)) is continuous for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and further
min
λ∈[0,1]
CS,CR(W(λ)) > 0. (26)
On the other hand, since W = {W1,W2} is symmetrizable,
we have
CS(W(0)) = CS(W) = 0.
But due to (26), CS(W(λ)) is discontinuous in λ = 0. This
will then conclude the proof.
Before we start proving the first step, we define suitable
channels given by matrices
W 1 =
(
WT11
WT12
)
and W 2 =
(
WT21
WT22
)
with vectors
W11 =
10
0
 , W12 =
00
1
 , W21 =
00
1
 , W22 =
01
0
 .
Similarly as in (22), we define convex combinations of these
vectors with the rows of Wˆ in (18). In more detail, for each
λ ∈ (0, 1) we have
W11(λ) = (1− λ)
10
0
+ λ
10
0
 =
10
0

W12(λ) = (1− λ)
00
1
+ λ
01
0
 =
 0λ
1− λ

W21(λ) = (1− λ)
00
1
+ λ
10
0
 =
 λ0
1− λ

W22(λ) = (1− λ)
01
0
+ λ
01
0
 =
01
0
 .
Now we are in the position to show the first step as
outlined above. Therefore, we first show by contradiction that
the AVC W(λ) = {W1(λ),W2(λ)} = {Ws,λ}s=1,2 is non-
symmetrizable for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. Accordingly, we assume that
this channel is symmetrizable, i.e., for each λ ∈ (0, 1] there
exists a stochastic matrix σ : X → P(S) with∑
s∈S
Ws,λ(y|x1)σ(s|x2) =
∑
s∈S
Ws,λ(y|x2)σ(s|x1)
for all y ∈ {1, 2, 3} and x1, x2 ∈ {1, 2}, cf. Definition 5. With
s ∈ {1, 2} this would imply10
0
σ(1|2)+
 λ0
1− λ
σ(2|2) =
 0λ
1− λ
σ(1|1)+
01
0
σ(2|1).
With σ(1|2) = a, σ(2|2) = 1− a, a ∈ [0, 1], and σ(1|1) = b,
σ(2|1) = 1− b, b ∈ [0, 1], this can be written as10
0
 a+
 λ0
1− λ
 (1− a) =
 0λ
1− λ
 b+
01
0
 (1− b).
In particular, the second line is 0 = λb+ 1− b or equivalently
b = 11−λ . Now, λ ∈ (0, 1] implies that b > 1 which is a
contradiction. Thus, for λ ∈ (0, 1] the AVC W(λ) is non-
symmetrizable and therewith CS(W(λ)) = CS,CR(W(λ)) for
all λ ∈ (0, 1], cf. (25).
Next, we prove the second step, where we want to un-
derstand the behavior of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity
CS,CR(W(λ)) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. To do so, we look at the
corresponding CR-assisted capacity of the legitimate link (no
secrecy at this point). For any q ∈ P(S), let
Wq,λ(y|x) =
∑
s∈S
Ws,λ(y|x)q(s)
be the averaged channel as in (13). Then we know from results
for the classical AVC, cf. [22–24], that
CCR(W(λ)) = max
p∈P(X )
min
q∈P(S)
I(p,Wq,λ)
= min
q∈P(S)
max
p∈P(X )
I(p,Wq,λ) (27)
since P(X ) and P(S) are convex sets and the mutual infor-
mation I is concave in p and convex in Wq,λ. Moreover, (27)
is continuous in λ ∈ [0, 1].
Assume that there exists a λ0 ∈ [0, 1] with CCR(W(λ0)) =
0; then there must be a q0 ∈ P(S) such that
maxp∈P(X ) I(p,Wq0,λ0) = 0. This would imply for the matrix
Wq0,λ0 = (1− q0)W1,λ0 + q0W2,λ0
that both of its rows are equal, i.e., its output distribution does
not depend on the particular input x = 1 or x = 2. And this
means that
(1−q0)W11(λ0)+q0W21(λ0) = (1−q0)W12(λ0)+q0W22(λ0)
or equivalently1− q00
0
+
 q0λ00
q0(1− λ0)
 =
 0(1− q0)λ0
(1− q0)(1− λ0)
+
 0q0
0
 .
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This implies that 1− q0 + q0λ0 = 0 must hold, i.e.,
q0 =
1
1− λ0 .
For λ0 ∈ (0, 1], again, this would imply q0 > 1 which is
impossible. For λ0 = 0 on the other hand, we get q0 = 1 so
that the channel is simply given by the matrix W2. But this is
also not possible, since the rows are not the same. Thus, for
all λ ∈ [0, 1] we have CCR(W(λ)) > 0. Since the function is
continuous in λ, we have
min
λ∈[0,1]
CCR(W(λ)) > 0.
It remains to show that
CS,CR(W(λ)) = CCR(W(λ))
holds. Obviously, the inequality CS,CR(W(λ)) ≤ CCR(W(λ))
holds so that we only have to show the other direction.
Therefore, let R > 0 be a CR-assisted achievable rate for
non-secret communication, i.e., for each τ > 0 there exists
an n(τ) ∈ N and a sequence of (n, Jn,Gn, PΓ )-codes CCR
such that for all n ≥ n(τ) we have 1n log |Jn| ≥ R − τ
and maxsn∈Sn e¯n(sn‖CCR) → 0 as n → ∞. Now we have
to analyze the secrecy condition I(J ;Znsn‖CCR) for this code.
The corresponding joint probability distribution is given by
PJZn
sn
(j, zn) =
n∏
i=1
V (zi|xi, si)E(xn|j) 1|Jn| .
Since we only have one possible channel realization V , cf.
(20), in this particular example, we have V (z|x, s) = V (z|x).
Moreover, since V is the “useless” channel, the output zn
in
∏n
i=1 V (zi|xi)) is independent of the input xn so that
I(J ;Znsn‖CCR) = 0. We conclude that this rate then is
also achievable under the strong secrecy criterion which then
shows CS,CR(W(λ)) = CCR(W(λ)) so that (23) and therewith
assertion 1) of the theorem is proved.
Finally, we complete the proof for assertion 2) of the theo-
rem. Since the AVCW(λ) for λ ∈ (0, 1] is non-symmetrizable
so that CS,CR(W(λ)) = CCR(W(λ)), we also have
inf
λ∈(0,1]
CS(W(λ)) = min
λ∈[0,1]
CCR(W(λ)) > 0.
But since for λ = 0 the AVC W(λ) is symmetrizable, we
must have CS(W(0)) = 0 and therewith
lim inf
λ→0
CS(W(λ)) > CS(W(0)),
i.e., CS(·) is a discontinuous function which proves (24) and
therewith the assertion 2) of the theorem.
Remark 9. Note that Theorem 4 is proven for the strong
secrecy criterion. However, it also holds for the weak secrecy
criterion, which means that weakening the secrecy requirement
does not help to overcome the discontinuity problem.
Remark 10. From the construction of the example above it
follows immediately that the unassisted capacity of the clas-
sical AVC (without secrecy requirements) is discontinuous as
well. To the best of our knowledge this has not been observed
so far.
An interesting observation appears when we analyze the
previous result in the context of the different jamming strate-
gies of the adversary, cf. Remark 7. Obviously, the adversary
is not able to choose a state sequence that will provide any in-
formation leakage to him, i.e., that security criterion cannot be
attacked. Accordingly, the strategy will be to choose the state
sequence in such a way that the legitimate communication is
disturbed as much as possible.
Now for the case λ = 0 in Theorem 4 we see the following:
Whenever the legitimate users try to communicate at a positive
rate, the adversary can jam the communication such that the
decoding error at the legitimate receiver is always greater
than 1/4 since the W is symmetrizable (see also [27] for
more detailed discussion). Thus, no reliable communication
is possible.
On the other hand, for λ > 0 we have CS(W(λ)) > 0 so
that in this case reliable and secure communication is possible.
However, from this we cannot conclude on CS(W(0)) by
taking the limit λ→ 0, since λ = 0 is a discontinuous point.
Thus, it is not robust since small variations can result in a
dramatic loss in secrecy capacity.
B. Set of Non-Symmetrizable AVCs
Here we show that it is possible to have non-trivial sets of
AVWCs whose unassisted secrecy capacities are non-zero.
For this purpose, we consider channels σ, σ′ : X → P(S),
and an AVC given by the uncertainty set W . We define the
function
F (σ, σ′,W) =
∑
x1∈X
∑
x2∈X
∑
y∈Y
∣∣Wσ(y|x1, x2)−Wσ′(y|x1, x2)∣∣
with Wσ(y|x1, x2) =
∑
s∈SW (y|x1, s)σ(s|x2). Then F is a
continuous function of σ, σ′, and W .
Lemma 3. We have
min
σ,σ′
F (σ, σ′,W) = 0
if and only if the AVC W is symmetrizable.
Proof: If the AVC W with the channel σ : X → P(S) is
symmetrizable, then it obviously holds that F (σ, σ′,W) = 0.
Thus, we only have to show the other direction.
Let σˆ and σˆ′ be channels such that F (σˆ, σˆ′,W) = 0. Then
it also holds that Wσˆ(y|x1, x2) = Wσˆ′(y|x2, x1) for all y ∈ Y
and x1, x2 ∈ X . We can interchange the elements x2 and x1
to obtain Wσˆ(y|x2, x1) = Wσˆ′(y|x1, x2) for all y ∈ Y and
x1, x2 ∈ X as well. Now, with
σ˜(s|x) = 1
2
(
σˆ(s|x) + σˆ′(s|x))
we obtain∑
s∈S
W (y|x2, s)σ˜(s|x1)
=
1
2
(∑
s∈S
W (y|x2, s)σˆ(s|x1) +
∑
s∈S
W (y|x2, s)σˆ′(s|x1)
)
=
1
2
(
Wσˆ(y|x2, x1) +Wσˆ′(y|x2, x1)
)
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=
1
2
(
Wσˆ′(y|x2, x1) +Wσˆ(y|x1, x2)
)
=
∑
s∈S
(1
2
(
σˆ′(s|x2) + σˆ(s|x2)
)
W (y|x1, s)
)
=
∑
s∈S
W (y|x1, s)σ˜(s|x2)
which shows that the AVC W is symmetrizable, proving the
lemma.
Lemma 4. Let W1 be an AVC with finite state set S1 and
min
σ,σ′
F (σ, σ′,W1) = δ > 0.
Then there exists an  > 0 such that for all AVCs Wˆ2 with
finite state set S2 and D(W1,W2) <  it holds that
min
σ,σ′
F (σ, σ′, Wˆ2) ≥ δ
2
,
which means that these AVCs are also non-symmetrizable.
Proof: For every s2 ∈ S2 there exists an sˆ1 = sˆ1(s2)
such that
max
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
∣∣Wˆ (y|x, s2)−W (y|x, sˆ1)∣∣ < .
Then it holds that∣∣∣ ∑
s2∈S2
Wˆ (y|x, s2)σ(s2|xˆ)−
∑
s2∈S2
W (y|x, sˆ1(s2))σ(s2|xˆ)
∣∣∣
≤
∑
s2∈S2
∣∣Wˆ (y|x, s2)−W (y|x, sˆ1(s2))∣∣σ(s2|xˆ)
≤ 
∑
s2∈S2
σ(s2|xˆ) = .
Accordingly, we get∣∣∣ ∑
s2∈S2
σ(s2|xˆ)W (y|x, sˆ1(s2))−
∑
s2∈S2
σ′(s2|x)W (y|xˆ, sˆ1(s2))
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ ∑
s2∈S2
σ(s2|xˆ)
(
W (y|x, sˆ1(s2))− Wˆ (y|x, s2)
)
−
∑
s2∈S2
σ′(s2|x)
(
W (y|xˆ, sˆ1(s2))− Wˆ (y|xˆ, s2)
)
+
∑
s2∈S2
σ(s2|xˆ)Wˆ (y|xˆ, s2)−
∑
s2∈S2
σ′(s2|x)Wˆ (y|xˆ, s2)
∣∣∣
≤ 2+
∣∣∣∑
s2∈S2
σ(s2|xˆ)Wˆ (y|x, s2)−
∑
s2∈S2
σ′(s2|xˆ)Wˆ (y|x, s2)
∣∣∣.
(28)
Now, we define the channels σ˜, σ˜′ : X → P(S1) as follows:
For fixed s1 ∈ S1 let I(s1) be the set of all s2 with sˆ1(s2) =
s1. Then we set
σ˜(s1|x) =
∑
s2∈I(s1)
σ(s2|x).
Similarly, we define the channel σ˜′. Then left hand side of
(28) is equal to∣∣∣ ∑
s1∈S1
σ˜(s1|xˆ)W (y|x, s1)−
∑
s1∈S1
σ˜′(s1|x)W (y|xˆ, s1)
∣∣∣
and therewith greater than δ per definition. Thus, we get∣∣∣ ∑
s2∈S2
σ(s2|xˆ)Wˆ (y|x, s2)−
∑
s2∈S2
σ′(s2|x)Wˆ (y|xˆ, s2)
∣∣∣
≥ δ − 2. (29)
Finally, we set  < δ4 to complete the proof, since the right
hand side of (29) is independent of σ and σ′ so that we can
equivalently choose the minimum.
With these lemmas we are in the position to prove the
following result which shows that there are sets of AVWCs
that all have a non-zero unassisted secrecy capacities.
Theorem 5. LetW be an AVWC with finite state set such that
CS(W) > 0. Then there exists an  > 0 such that for all
AVWCs Wˆ with finite state sets and D(W, Wˆ) <  we have
CS(Wˆ) > 0.
Proof: Since CS(W) > 0, we know from Theorem 3 that
the corresponding AVC W to the legitimate receiver is non-
symmetrizable. Then from Lemma 3 it follows that there must
exist a δ > 0 such that F (σ, σ′,W) ≥ δ > 0. Since CS,CR(W)
is continuous, cf. Remark 8, and CS,CR(W) > 0, there exists
an ˆ > 0 such that for all AVWCs Wˆ with finite state sets and
D(W, Wˆ) < ˆ we also have CS,CR(Wˆ) > 0. Now, we choose
an  < ˆ in such a way that Lemma 4 still holds. This implies
that all AVCs Wˆ with finite state sets and D(W, Wˆ) <  are
non-symmetrizable so that we have CS(Wˆ) = CS,CR(Wˆ) > 0.
C. Set of Symmetrizable AVCs
In Section V-A it was shown that the unassisted secrecy
capacity of an AVWC can have a discontinuity point. Thus,
symmetrizable AVCs in the legitimate link can appear as a
discontinuity point within sets of non-symmetrizable AVCs.
Here, we want to show that it is also possible that there are
non-trivial sets of symmetrizable AVCs.
To do so, we construct an example of an AVWC W∗ such
that, for a set of AVWCs W around this channel W∗, we
always have CS,CR(W) > 0 and CS(W) = CS(W∗) = 0.
Therefore, we define the AVC to the legitimate receiver by
the uncertainty set W∗ = {W ∗1 ,W ∗2 } with
W ∗1 =
(
1
2
1
2 0
1
4 0
3
4
)
and W ∗2 =
(
0 0 1
0 1 0
)
.
For the AVC to the eavesdropper we choose again V = {V, V }
with V as in (20). With this choice, the channel to the eaves-
dropper remains fixed, while for the channel to the legitimate
receiver we allow appropriate variations. The corresponding
AVWC W∗ is then W∗ = {W∗,V}.
Further, we define the channel σ∗ : X → P(S) as
σ∗ =
(
4
5
1
5
2
5
3
5
)
.
Then a simple calculation shows immediately that∑
s∈S
W ∗s (y|1)σ∗(s|2) =
∑
s∈S
W ∗s (y|2)σ∗(s|1)
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holds for all y ∈ Y , which means that the AVC W∗ is
symmetrizable so that CS(W∗) = 0 by Theorem 3. Now, the
following theorem shows that there exists a set around this
AVWC which has zero secrecy capacity as well.
Theorem 6. There exists an 0 > 0 such that for all AVWCs
W = {W,V} with finite state sets and D(W∗,W) < 0 it
always holds that
CS,CR(W) > 0 and CS(W) = 0.
Proof: Due to Theorem 4 it suffices to concentrate on the
AVC W to the legitimate receiver. Due to the choice of V , cf.
(20), for all AVWCs W we have
CS(W) = C(W) (30)
and
CS,CR(W) = CCR(W). (31)
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4, we can show that
CCR(W∗) > 0. Since CCR(·) is a continuous function, there
exists an 0 > 0 such that for all AVCs W with finite state
sets and D(W∗,W) < 0 we have CCR(W) > 0 as well.
Due to relation (30) it remains to show that there exists an
1 with 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 0 such that all AVCsW with finite state sets
and D(W∗,W) < 1 are symmetrizable. This can be shown
similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4 which then concludes
the proof.
VI. ROBUSTNESS OF WEAK SECRECY CODES
For the AVWC we have seen that the CR-assisted secrecy
capacity CS,CR(W) is continuous in the uncertainty set W.
In contrast to this, the unassisted secrecy capacity CS(W)
displays a discontinuous behavior. In particular, the previous
discussion reveals that CS(W) is always a continuous function
of the eavesdropper channel, while the discontinuity comes
from the legitimate channel only; see [30] for further details.
The fact that the secrecy capacity depends in a continuous
way on the eavesdropper channel is a desirable property as it
shows the robustness of the secrecy requirement. However, we
cannot conclude from a continuous dependency of the secrecy
capacity on the eavesdropper channel that any particular
code itself displays this continuity as well. However, in the
following we want to show that this is indeed the case.
We consider two AVWCs W1 = {W,V1} and W2 =
{W,V2} which share the same AVC W to the legitimate
receiver, but consist of different AVCs V1 and V2 to the
eavesdropper. The question we want to explore is now the
following: Is a “good” code (which realizes secrecy) for W1
also a “good” code for W2 when both eavesdropper channels
are close (i.e., D(V1,V2) ≤  for some small  > 0)? We will
answer this for the weak secrecy criterion for which (15) is
replaced by
max
sn∈Sn
1
n
I(J ;Znsn‖Cn) ≤ δn.
For this purpose, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For n ∈ N arbitrary let Vm, V˜m : X → P(Z),
m ∈ {1, ..., n}, be channels with
d(Vm, V˜m) ≤ 
for some  > 0. Let U be an arbitrary finite set, PU ∈ P(U)
the uniform distribution on U , and E(xn|u), xn ∈ Xn, an
arbitrary stochastic encoder, cf. (1). We consider probability
distributions
PUZn =
∑
xn∈Xn
n∏
m=1
Vm(zm|xm)E(xn|u)PU (u)
P˜UZn =
∑
xn∈Xn
n∏
m=1
V˜m(zm|xm)E(xn|u)PU (u).
Then it holds that∣∣I(U ;Zn‖P )− I(U ;Zn‖P˜ )∣∣ ≤ nδ2(, |Z|) (32)
with δ2(, |Z|) as in Lemma 2, cf. (2).
Proof: The proof follows by a suitable adaptation of the
proof of Lemma 2. This is sketched in Appendix C.
Now we are in the position to show that a code that realizes
secrecy over a certain AVC, is also a “good” code for all AVCs
in a certain neighborhood.
Theorem 7. Let V with finite state set S be an AVC to the
eavesdropper and for n ∈ N let Cn be an unassisted code that
achieves weak secrecy
max
sn∈Sn
1
n
I(J ;Znsn‖Cn) = δn. (33)
Then it holds for all AVCs V∗ with finite state sets S∗ and
D(V,V∗) ≤  that
max
sn∗∈Sn∗
1
n
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖Cn) < δn + δ2(, |Z|) (34)
with δ2(, |Z|) as in Lemma 2, cf. (8).
Proof: Let V∗ with finite state set S∗ be an arbi-
trary AVC that satisfies D(V,V∗) < . Further, let sn∗ =
(s1,∗, s2,∗, ..., sn,∗) ∈ S∗ be arbitrary. Then for every sm,∗,
m ∈ {1, ..., n}, there exists an sm = sm(sm,∗) ∈ S such that
d(Vsm,∗ , Vsm) < .
This allows us to apply Lemma 5 from which we obtain∣∣ 1
n
I(J ;Znsn‖Cn)−
1
n
I(J ;Znsn(sn∗ )‖Cn)
∣∣ < δ2(, |Z|)
so that
1
n
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖Cn) ≤
∣∣ 1
n
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖Cn)−
1
n
I(J ;Znsn(sn∗ )‖Cn)
∣∣
+
1
n
I(J ;Znsn(sn∗ )‖Cn)
< δn + δ2(, |Z|)
which proves the result.
Next, we want to establish a similar result for CR-assisted
codes as well.
Theorem 8. Let V with finite state set S be an AVC to the
eavesdropper and for n ∈ N let CCR,n be a CR-assisted code
that achieves weak secrecy
max
sn∈Sn
1
n
I(J ;Znsn‖CCR,n) = δn. (35)
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Then it holds for all AVCs V∗ with finite state sets S∗ and
D(V,V∗) ≤  that
max
sn∗∈Sn∗
1
n
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖CCR,n) < δn + δ2(, |Z|) (36)
with δ2(, |Z|) as in Lemma 2, cf. (8).
Proof: As in Theorem 7 let sn∗ = (s1,∗, s2,∗, ..., sn,∗) ∈
S∗ be arbitrary. Then for every sm,∗, m ∈ {1, ..., n}, there
exists an sm = sm(sm,∗) ∈ S such that d(Vsm,∗ , Vsm) <
. Then Lemma 5 immediately yields | 1nI(J ;Znsn‖CCR,n) −
1
nI(J ;Z
n
sn(sn∗ )
‖CCR,n)| < δ2(, |Z|) so that
1
n
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖CCR,n) =
1
n
∑
γ∈Gn
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖Cn(γ))PΓ (γ)
≤
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
γ∈Gn
PΓ (γ)
(
I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖Cn(γ))− I(J ;Znsn(sn∗ )‖Cn(γ))
)∣∣∣
+
1
n
∑
γ∈Gn
I(J ;Znsn(sn∗ )‖Cn(γ))PΓ (γ)
≤ 1
n
∑
γ∈Gn
PΓ (γ)
∣∣∣I(J ;Znsn∗ ‖Cn(γ))− I(J ;Znsn(sn∗ )‖Cn(γ))∣∣∣+ δn
≤
∑
γ∈Gn
PΓ (γ)δn + δ2(, |Z|) < δn + δ2(, |Z|)
which proves the result.
These results show that unassisted and CR-assisted codes
are indeed robust in the weak secrecy sense. A code with
a small information leakage rate for V as in (33) or (35)
has also a small information leakage for all AVCs V∗ with
D(V,V∗) ≤  as in (34) or (36), respectively. In addition,
the change in information leakage is explicitly quantified by
δ2(, |Z|) in (34) and (36). Note that, the robustness of codes
immediately imply that the secrecy capacity is continuous in
the eavesdropper channel as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered secure communication
over compound and arbitrarily varying channels. The analysis
of this paper was motivated by the question of whether the
secrecy capacity depends continuously on the uncertainty set
or not. Obviously, a continuous behavior is desirable as then
small changes in the uncertainty set result in only small
changes in the secrecy capacity. This becomes particularly rel-
evant in the context of active adversaries where the uncertainty
set describes the strategy space of an adversary.
Surprisingly, the answer to the question of whether the
secrecy is continuous or not depends highly on the abilities
of the adversary – even for the simplest case of an uncertainty
set containing two elements. If the actual realization from this
uncertainty set remains constant for the whole duration of the
transmission, the scenario at hand is the compound wiretap
channel and the corresponding secrecy capacity is a continuous
function of this uncertainty set. However, if the adversary is
allowed to vary in an unknown and arbitrary manner between
these two realizations during the transmission, the legitimate
users have to deal with an AVWC and its unassisted secrecy
capacity can be discontinuous in the uncertainty set. More so-
phisticated strategies based on common randomness can help
to overcome this discontinuity problem and the corresponding
CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC is a continuous
function of the uncertainty set.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of the lemma follows [38] where a similar result
is presented in the context of quantum information. However,
in contrast to the quantum version in [38] we are able to get a
better constant by using the fact that H(Y |X‖PXY ) ≥ 0 for
all PXY ∈ P(X × Y).
Let PXY , QXY ∈ P(X ×Y) with ‖PXY −QXY ‖ ≤ . We
assume that∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
|PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y)| =  (37)
is satisfied with equality since otherwise we could replace 
in (37) with a smaller ˜ <  accordingly.
We define
f(x, y) := |PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y)| (38)
and set
p∗(x, y) = (1− )PXY (x, y) + f(x, y)
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y so that p∗ ∈ P(X ,Y) is a joint
probability distribution on X × Y .
Further, we set
pˆ(x, y) =
1

f(x, y), (39a)
qˆ(x, y) =
1

(
(1− )[PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y)]+ f(x, y)).
(39b)
We have to check that pˆ and qˆ are well defined in the sense that
they are probability distributions. pˆ(x, y) ≥ 0 for all (x, y) ∈
X ×Y is obviously true. It remains to check that qˆ(x, y) ≥ 0
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y is also satisfied.
If PXY (x, y) ≤ QXY (x, y), then
−f(x, y) ≤ PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y)
≤ (1− )(PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y)) ≤ 0
so that qˆ(x, y) ≥ 0. On the other hand, if PXY (x, y) >
QXY (x, y), then
0 < (1− )(PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y))
≤ PXY (x, y)−QXY (x, y) ≤ f(x, y)
so that qˆ(x, y) ≥ 0 also in this case. Further, from the
definition of pˆ and qˆ in (39) and (37)-(38) it can easily be
verified that∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
pˆ(x, y) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
qˆ(x, y) = 1
so that pˆ ∈ P(X ×Y) and qˆ ∈ P(X ×Y) are joint probability
distributions.
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With this we can express p∗ as
p∗(x, y) = (1− )PXY (x, y) + pˆ(x, y) (40a)
= (1− )QXY (x, y) + qˆ(x, y) (40b)
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Next, we show that (40a) implies∣∣H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)∣∣ ≤  log |Y|+H2(). (41)
To do so, we use the fact that the conditioned entropy is
concave, i.e.,
H(Y |X‖p∗) ≥ (1− )H(Y |X‖PXY ) + H(Y |X‖pˆ).
With this, we have
H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)
≤ H(Y |X‖PXY )− (1− )H(Y |X‖PXY )− H(Y |X‖pˆ)
= 
(
H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖pˆ)
)
≤ H(Y |X‖PXY ) ≤  log |Y|. (42)
Using the concavity of the entropy
H(X‖p∗) ≥ (1− )H(X‖PXY ) + H(X‖pˆ)
and the upper bound on the joint entropy
H(X,Y ‖p∗) ≤ (1−)H(X,Y ‖PXY )+H(X,Y ‖pˆ)+H2(),
we get
H(Y |X‖p∗) = H(X,Y ‖p∗)−H(X‖p∗)
≤ (1− )H(Y |X‖PXY ) + H(Y |X‖p∗) +H2()
and further
H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)
≥ −(H(Y |X‖p∗)−H(Y |X‖PXY ))−H2()
≥ −H(Y |X‖p∗)−H2() ≥ − log |Y| −H2(). (43)
Now, (42) and (43) yield∣∣H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)∣∣ ≤  log |Y|+H2()
which shows (41). (By the same arguments, one can show that
(40b) implies |H(Y |X‖QXY ) − H(Y |X‖p∗)| ≤  log |Y| +
H2().)
Finally, this yields∣∣H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖QXY )∣∣
=
∣∣H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)
+
(
H(Y |X‖p∗)−H(Y |X‖QXY )
)∣∣
≤ ∣∣H(Y |X‖PXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)∣∣
+
∣∣H(Y |X‖QXY )−H(Y |X‖p∗)∣∣
≤ 2 log |Y|+ 2H2()
which is (6) proving the lemma.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Let 0 ≤ k ≤ n arbitrary. We define
P
(k)
UY n(u, y
n) :=
∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+1˜
W (yl|xl)E(xn|u)PU (u).
(44)
Then it holds that P (0)UY n = P˜UY n andP
(n)
UY n = PUY n . Now
we have
I(U ;Y n‖P (n)UY n)− I(U ;Y n‖P (0)UY n)
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
I(U ;Y n‖P (k+1)UY n − I(U ;Y n‖P (k)UY n)
)
.
(45)
For all 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 it holds that
I(U ;Y n‖P (k+1)UY n )− I(U ;Y n‖P (k)UY n)
= H(Y n‖P (k+1)UY n )−H(Y n‖P (k)UY n)
−H(U, Y n‖P (k+1)UY n ) +H(U, Y n‖P (k)UY n). (46)
We want to analyze the right hand side of (46) in more detail.
We present the analysis for the second expression, the other
one follows by the same arguments. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 we
have∑
u∈U
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣P (k+1)UY n (u, yn)− P (k)UY n(u, yn)∣∣
=
∑
u∈U
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣∣∣ ∑
xn∈Xn
( k+1∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)
−
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+1
W˜ (yl|xl)
)
E(xn|u)PU (u)
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
u∈U
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣∣∣ ∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)
×
(
W (yk+1|xk+1)− W˜ (yk+1|xk+1)
)
E(xn|u)PU (u)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
u∈U
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)
×
∣∣∣W (yk+1|xk+1)− W˜ (yk+1|xk+1)∣∣∣E(xn|u)PU (u)
=
∑
u∈U
∑
xn∈Xn
( ∑
yn∈Yn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)
×
∣∣∣W (yk+1|xk+1)− W˜ (yk+1|xk+1)∣∣∣)E(xn|u)PU (u)
=
∑
u∈U
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yk+1∈Y
∣∣∣W (yk+1|xk+1)− W˜ (yk+1|xk+1)∣∣∣
× E(xn|u)PU (u)
<  ·
∑
u∈U
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|u)PU (u) =  (47)
where (47) follows from the fact that the distance between W
and W˜ is small by assumption, cf. (7). Thus, (47) shows that
the total variation between the joint probability distributions
P
(k)
UY n and P
(k+1)
UY n is smaller than .
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We define Y n−k := (Y1, Y2, ..., Yk−1, Yk+1, ..., Yn) as the
sequence without the k-th element. In the following we
study the random variables (U, Y n−(k+1)) which are distributed
according to P (k+1)UY n , i.e., they have the probability distribution
P
(k+1)
UY n−(k+1)
(u, yn−(k+1)) =
∑
yk+1∈Y
P
(k+1)
UY n (u, y
n)
=
∑
yk+1∈Y
∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)W (yk+1|xk+1)
×
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)E(xn|u)PU (u)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)E(xn|u)PU (u).
(48)
Similarly, we look at the random variables (U, Y n−(k+1)) which
are distributed according to P (k)UY n , i.e.,
P
(k)
UY n−(k+1)
(u, yn−(k+1)) =
∑
yk+1∈Y
P
(k)
UY n(u, y
n)
=
∑
yk+1∈Y
∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)W˜ (yk+1|xk+1)
×
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)E(xn|u)PU (u)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
k∏
l=1
W (yl|xl)
n∏
l=k+2
W˜ (yl|xl)E(xn|u)PU (u)
= P
(k+1)
UY n−(k+1)
(u, yn−(k+1)) (49)
and observe that P (k)UY n and P
(k+1)
UY n have the same marginal
distribution for (U, Y n−(k+1)). This implies that
H(U, Y n−(k+1)‖P (k+1)UY n ) = H(U, Y n−(k+1)‖P (k)UY n) (50)
so that∣∣H(U, Y n‖P (k+1)UY n )−H(U, Y n‖P (k)UY n)∣∣
=
∣∣H(U, Y n‖P (k+1)UY n )−H(U, Y n−(k+1)‖P (k+1)UY n )
+H(U, Y n−(k+1)‖P (k)UY n)−H(U, Y n‖P (k)UY n)
∣∣
=
∣∣H(Yk+1|U, Y n−(k+1)‖P (k+1)UY n )
−H(Yk+1|U, Y n−(k+1)‖P (k)UY n)
∣∣
< 2 log |Y|+ 2H2() (51)
where the first step follows from (50) and the last step from
Lemma 1 and (47). Similarly, using the same ideas one can
easily show that∣∣H(Y n‖P (k+1)UY n )−H(Y n‖P (k)UY n)∣∣ < 2 log |Y|+ 2H2()
(52)
holds as well.
Now, inserting (51) and (52) into (46), we obtain
|I(U ;Y n‖P (k+1)UY n ) − I(U ;Y n‖P (k)UY n)| ≤ 4 log |Y| +
4H2() =: δ2(, |Y|) so that the expression in (45) becomes∣∣I(U ;Y n‖P (n)UY n)− I(U ;Y n‖P (0)UY n)∣∣
≤
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣I(U ;Y n‖P (k+1)UY n )− I(U ;Y n‖P (k)UY n)∣∣ ≤ nδ2(, |Y|)
which proves the lemma.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
In the previous Lemma 2 the channels remains the same
for the whole block length n. In contrast to that, the current
Lemma 5 allows different channels for each time instant.
Investigating the proof of Lemma 2 reveals that the proof
remains valid when we replace the channels W and W˜ by
the new channels Vm and V˜m, where m ∈ {1, ..., n} is chosen
according to the corresponding time instant in (44), (47), (48),
and (49). Then the desired result follows immediately.
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